Corruption Control in the Developed World by Mascio, Fabrizio Di & Piattoni, Simona
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463)
2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 72–77
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v8i2.3274
Editorial
Corruption Control in the Developed World
Fabrizio Di Mascio 1,* and Simona Piattoni 2
1 Interuniversity Department of Regional and Urban Studies and Planning, University of Turin, 10125 Turin, Italy;
E-Mail: fabrizio.dimascio@unito.it
2 Department of Sociology and Social Research, University of Trento, 38122 Trento, Italy; E-Mail: simona.piattoni@unitn.it
* Corresponding author
Submitted: 20 May 2020 | Published: 28 May 2020
Abstract
Conventionally considered a developmental trait that would tend to disappear with the increase of wealth and the sta-
bilization of democracy, corruption is rampant not just among developing countries and recent democracies, but also in
mature democracies and developed countries. This editorial introduces the thematic issue and considers what the con-
tributions tell us about new approaches to corruption control in the developed world. It also outlines avenues for future
research in the field of corruption control.
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1. Introduction
Since the early 1990s, protests around the globe
against corrupt officials have stimulated academic re-
search on the topic of corruption, as revealed by
new books being published on a never-ending ba-
sis (Bauhr, Bågenholm, Grimes, & Rothstein, in press;
Mungiu-Pippidi & Heywood, 2020). Corruption control
strategies have drawn on this expanding body of re-
search, but they have proved ineffective in achieving
significant and lasting improvement in quality of gov-
ernment. The discrepancy between the high interest in
corruption and the low capacity to curb it reveals that
the phenomenon is broader and more diversified than
the conventional literature and policy recommendations
would lead us to think. Whilst previous work on causes
and consequences of corruption has helped us to under-
stand broad patterns of corrupt practice, and where it is
most deeply embedded, it has been less helpful for iden-
tifying what can be done.
For a growing number of researchers, the imple-
mentation gap of corruption control efforts lies in
the inappropriate theoretical foundations of the stan-
dard solutions to the ‘principal-agent’ problem (Persson,
Rothstein, & Teorell, 2019). According to these re-
searchers, the solutions to the ‘principal-agent’ problem
consider corruption as a problem of individual deviance
from the system, implicitly assuming that corruption can
be tackled if control instruments affect individual agents’
motivations to engage in corrupt behavior. They under-
line that this assumption is flawed in those contexts
where corruption is systemic, meaning that corruption is
widely perceived as the norm, and those principals mon-
itoring the agents are themselves corruptible if they can-
not trust that others will resist corruption.
Viewing corruption as a collective action problem
has made an important contribution to the literature by
highlighting the very difficult challenge that institutional
reforms face in changing levels of distrust in society.
However, this vision has little to say about what to do dif-
ferently, or how (Marquette & Peiffer, 2019). The call for
‘big bangs’ constitutes the theoretical answer, whereby
a multifaceted attack on corruption is applied in an inte-
gratedmanner to transform the system (Rothstein, 2011).
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Yet, the idea of rolling out a broad set of reforms predi-
cated on comprehensive institutional transformation is
simply not feasible in most OECD countries where state
traditions are so entrenched that ‘remaking’ the state is
unlikely. We thus need better ways of thinking about the
design and sequencing of targeted reforms in conditions
that are not hospitable for policies that change the basic
social contract. In other words, we need greater sensitiv-
ity to multiple reform combinations that unfold within
different contexts (Fritzen & Dobel, 2018).
Recently, two strands of research have emerged that
do not depend on the occurrence of a crisis to implement
governance reforms. Drawing on policymaking literature
(Heclo, 1974), one set of scholars disagree with the ‘pow-
ering’ thesis that underscores those approaches that fo-
cus on abrupt and wholesale change. Rather, they under-
stand anticorruption reform as ‘problem-solving,’ mean-
ing that reformers take advantage of small opportunities
and use the complexity of policy areas to advance indi-
viduallyminor but often cumulatively significant changes
(Bersch, 2016, p. 206). In contrast to approaches that
separate the question of stability from the question of
change, the problem-solving take on corruption control
echoes the sequencing approach that is well established
in the historical-institutionalist literature (Mahoney &
Thelen, 2010). It also allows to account for the implica-
tions of the two-level governance structure of corrup-
tion control. Work on corruption control is characterized
by a strong focus on top-down conformance with pol-
icy recommendations issued by international organiza-
tions. Governments are encouraged to adopt a global
menu of tools that are proposed as universal cure for cor-
ruption (Rotberg, 2017). Conversely, the problem-solving
perspective emphasizes the role of policy implementers
within domestic policy arenas. These actors should have
flexibility for context-sensitive adjustments in order to
address specific policy problems. The problem-solving
perspective is all the more relevant in developed set-
tings where compliance is not driven by external pres-
sure through policy conditionality. In these settings, pol-
icy actors should first aim at improving those structural
factors (fiscal transparency, administrative simplification,
professional bureaucracies, etc.) that are prerequisites
for the success of the global menu of corruption control
tools (Mungiu-Pippidi & Dadašov, 2017). Second, they
should select specific corruption control tools that can
be incrementally sequenced over time by taking capac-
ity constraints into account.
A second strand of research has highlighted effec-
tive subunits that lie hidden within countries known for
widespread corruption (McDonnell, 2020). By gauging
the workings of high-performing niches that exhibit fea-
tures distinct from poor-performing peer organizations,
this nascent literature shed light on variations and nu-
ances so far overlooked by most studies in the field,
which consider the public sector as a monolithic en-
tity (McDonnell, 2017). This literature constitutes the
foundation for an approach that promotes change at
the micro-level of individual organizations. As more
and more organizations improve their performance over
time, significant change could spread throughout the
public sector (Prasad, da Silva, & Nickow, 2019).
The articles of this thematic issue move the debate
forward and point tomore targeted interventions for cor-
ruption control. All in all, findings support the claim that
policies should be underpinned by clearer conceptualiza-
tion of corruption types, their meanings and functions
within specific institutional contexts and policy dynam-
ics (Heath, Richards, & de Graaf, 2016; Heywood, 2017;
Jancsics, 2019).
2. Overview of Contributions
As the title of the thematic issue suggests, our aimwas to
take stock of the mechanisms through which advanced
societies try to control corruption. We were, and still are,
particularly struck by the diffusion of corrupt practices
in the developed world, that is, in a context in which
the layperson would assume that corruption is marginal
and exceptional. On the contrary, we know from the lit-
erature and from daily news that this is far from being
the case and that also developed countries are beset
by corruption.
As is commonly the case with phenomena that defy
normative expectations, we knew that we would run
up against the difficulty of defining corruption. In com-
mon language, ‘corruption’ indicates a negative depar-
ture from a normative standard, but what precisely con-
stitutes such a departure heavily depends on the culture,
institutions, and procedures of each country. Therefore,
we were not surprised to find that some articles tackled
also (broadly understood) definitional questions. Bauhr
and Charron (2020), for example, distinguish between
‘need’ and ‘greed’ corruption, suggesting that the former
might be judged less harshly than the latter. Need cor-
ruption, moreover, seems to mostly involve women who
often carry the burden of caring for the young, the sick
and the elderly in the family and are, therefore, particu-
larly sensitive to the urgency of having access to public
services which may depend on someone’s help in ‘cut-
ting the queue.’ Piattoni and Giglioli (2020) similarly sug-
gest that some forms of particularism, which contem-
plate an exchange between candidates and sectional in-
terests or entire electoral constituencies, may be less
serious corruptions of democracy than exchanges that
involve individual voters or that imply the exchange of
money for selective benefits. They argue that the provi-
sion of constituency-level public goods may in fact help
wean democracies from graver forms of particularistic
exchanges. Although neither article systematically ad-
dresses the issue of defining corruption, they both alert
us to the dangers of adopting definitions that are too
encompassing and that might therefore expand the con-
tours of the phenomenon beyond recognition.
Beyond definition, the core aim of the thematic is-
sue was to canvass the current literature to extract use-
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 72–77 73
ful suggestions on how to control corruption in advanced
societies and to find those perhaps less explored mech-
anisms and tools that can make a real difference. The
mirror problem of agreeing on a shared definition is
finding a convincing measure of corruption (Heywood
& Rose, 2014). The most popular measurement relies
on the perceptions of privileged observers (businesspeo-
ple, journalists, scholars) which notoriously are sticky
and may be influenced as much by hearsay as by di-
rect experience. Perceptions can be shaped by a host
of contextual variables that do not necessarily correlate
very strongly with more objective measures of corrup-
tion based on direct personal experience. One such con-
textual variable, which has an important effect on the
perception of corruption, is the freedom of the press.
As the article by Breen and Gillanders (2020) shows a
freer press may induce a perception of lesser corruption
above andbeyonddifferences in the underlying phenom-
ena. While a free press certainly is an important tool in
the fight against corruption, its effect may be more ‘cos-
metic’ than real in that it induces the belief that corrup-
tion, if detected and denounced, would be in fact more
harshly punished.
A similar reputational effect might be exerted by
another contextual variable such as the adoption of a
lobby register, one of the standard recommendations of
the OECD. De Francesco and Trein (2020) discuss how
such a measure may have the effect of curbing the un-
due influence of business lobbies, by reducing the infor-
mation asymmetry between public officials and citizens.
Nevertheless the stark contrast between the experiences
of Slovenia—where a lobby register has been adopted
since the 2010s and a shared and regulated notion of
lobbying has been promoted—and Italy—where despite
several attempts no register has ever been introduced
at the national level because of a widespread rejection
of the very notion of lobbying and therefore a refusal to
regulate it—is very telling.
Both contributions argue that contextual variables
that improve the transparency of potentially corrupt
deals should make it simpler for businesspeople and
citizens to monitor the behavior of politicians and ad-
ministrators who, in this view, are uniquely interested
in extracting unwarranted resources (money or votes)
from the members of civil society. Any device that im-
proves the transparency of the dealings between politi-
cians and administrators, on the one hand, and civil so-
ciety, on the other, should help the latter fight corrup-
tion. Businesspeople, voters, and citizens at large may in
fact feel relatively powerless in refusing and sanctioning
such offers should institutional and structural conditions
be perceived as unsurmountable or they may be driven
bymaximizing calculations to accept them. Transparency
measures are certainly important but may also produce
frustration rather than resolve (Bauhr & Grimes, 2014).
Effective measures should operate also on the supply
side of corruption, making it less rewarding for elected
and career officials to offer corrupt deals.
The attention gets, therefore, directed to the incen-
tives that may affect the supply side of corruption. Two
articles directly address this side of corruption control.
Drápalová and Di Mascio (2020) detail how the institu-
tionalization of city managers may drastically improve
the quality of municipal governments despite their be-
longing to regions otherwise affected by widespread
corruption and not significantly differing from other,
similarly structured surrounding municipalities. They at-
tribute this rather extraordinary result to the profes-
sional aspirations of the city managers and to their sen-
sitivity to contextual features of governance. In practice,
city managers operate to decouple the promises made
in the electoral circuit from the activities performed by
the administrative sector and constitute a sort of institu-
tional check that offers elected politicians the possibility
of playing a virtuous two-level game with the voters in
contexts marked by the longevity of incumbents. This ar-
ticle contributes to the expanding literature dealing with
the impact of political competition on corruption con-
trol by identifying under which conditions a low level of
political competition may support the launch of institu-
tional reforms (Schnell, 2018). It shows that political vul-
nerability also originates from elections in units different
from those under investigation (regional elections and lo-
cal elections in surroundingmunicipalities). Mayors in re-
gions dominated by other parties felt constrained and fo-
cused on showcasing their ability as goodmanagers. The
existence of such pressures implies that political com-
petition occurring in the units of analysis is not capa-
ble of telling the entire story and that multi-arena pat-
terns might be important political determinants of insti-
tutional reforms at the local level.
A warning against the excessive use of oversight and
punishment mechanisms in the public administration
comes from the work of Odilla (2020) who draws her em-
pirical material from an innovative dataset of legal prose-
cutions of administrative wrongdoing in Brazil as well as
semi-structured interviews. She examines the effective-
ness of the horizontal accountability incentives created
within various administrative agencies and discovers that
the performance of the ‘integrity enforcers’ is hampered
by reluctance and uncertainty. Unless the investigation
of administrative corruption is entrusted to specialized
structures and their operations streamlined, the danger
of a discretionary pursuit of cases of corruption will act
as a deterrent against the diffusion and standardization
of these practices. Together these articles drive home
the message that the public administration is a crucial
intervening variable in most attempts to curb corruption
and that the professionalization of bureaucracies is cru-
cial. Most of the literature on corruption still overlooks
the management of public officials and this is a signif-
icant omission given the role that these actors play in
corrupt governmental networks (Della Porta & Vannucci,
1999; Jancsics & Jàvor, 2012). Therefore, there is need
for research assessing the effects of a broad set of pub-
lic personnel management practices to gain a deeper un-
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derstanding of corruption, and how to curb it (Meyer-
Sahling, Mikkelsen, & Schuster, 2018).
Patronage—that particular form of corruption ac-
cording to which jobs in the public administration are dis-
tributed to friends and political supporters rather than
according to merit—is not only bad in itself because it
deprives the state of much needed professional skills,
but is also instrumental in multiplying and spreading to
the entire system corrupt practices that have to rely on
the complacency of the public administration to be per-
fected. Sometimes, a perception of widespread corrup-
tion is as damaging as its actual diffusion. If corruption is
perceived as systemic and if, on the other hand, corrup-
tion control is perceived as selective, the effectiveness
of integrity enforcement and the rational calculations
of all agents involved will be negatively affected. That
this might be the case even in otherwise very different
countries (also in terms of the corruption perception in-
dex that characterizes them) is further confirmed by the
article by Gisladottir, Sigurgeirsdottir, Stjernquist, and
Ragnarsdottir (2020) who study the corrupt practices
that surround themanagement of the fishing and timber
sectors in Iceland and Romania, respectively. The loops
that describe the management of these two econom-
ically crucial sectors—that hinge upon renewable, but
also depletable, resources—are not identical in terms
of the incentives and perceptions that they create but
lead to surprisingly similar phenomena. If, for whatever
reason, corruption control is perceived as ineffective or
for going only after the ‘small fish,’ then the incentives
for stepping it up decrease and resignation and cynicism
rather take hold. Fortunately, new technology may lend
a helping hand by making monitoring of over-fishing and
over-harvesting simpler and accessible to a larger pool of
concerned individuals thatmay amplify the enforcement
capacity of the institutional inspectors.
Fazekas and Wachs (2020) draw our attention back
to the incentives that affect the political class, on
whose decisions all other institutional incentives de-
pend. They discover that in public procurement—a clas-
sically corruption-prone area of administrative activity—
corruption operates to discriminate against certain
providers and to hamper the competitive functioning of
the market. In other words, corrupt public procurement
networks are thinner than non-corrupt ones. Contested
political elections and government turnover lead to the
renegotiation of the contracts and to the reconfiguration
of the networks, which opens up at least the possibility
of replacing some favored providers. They conclude that
a well-functioning democracy characterized by compet-
itive elections and alternation in government should in-
crease the chances of breaking corrupt networks.
This article brings us back to the political level. We
infer from this perusal across many different OECD coun-
tries, levels of government, and institutional branches
that corruption control in advanced societies can be con-
tained only thanks to context-specific mechanisms that
both reduce the incentives to engage in corrupt deals for
the actors that lie at the supply end and increase the con-
venience to monitor and punish for the actors that stand
at the demand end.
3. Future Research
In conclusion, we outline avenues for future research in
the field of corruption control. While elections are ex-
pected to curb corruption, empirical tests of this expec-
tation have produced inconclusive results. Thus, there
is still room for work on factors like information and
loyalty that undermine accountability for corruption
(De Vries & Solaz, 2017). The surge in populist move-
ments has encouraged corruption control expectations
without delivering results, and this has further widened
the gap between voters and representative institutions
(Mungiu-Pippidi, 2020). Anti-corruption campaign has
helped populists to flourish, but populists themselves
seemingly have thought less about introducing effective
governance mechanisms than about rhetoric (Peters &
Pierre, 2019). This underlines the need for a broader re-
search agenda on populism, anti-corruption rhetoric and
good governance (Bågenholm & Charron, 2015).
Another avenue of research regards regulatory
and institutional innovation that has been a distinc-
tive feature of corruption control policy in the last
few decades. While anticorruption agencies have been
widely adopted, there is a limited amount of scholarship
on such agencies. An emerging literature has explored
the impact of organizational factors and leadership on
the effectiveness of anticorruption agencies (Di Mascio,
Maggetti, & Natalini, 2020; Tomic, 2019). These stud-
ies revealed that agencies’ effectiveness is not crucially
shaped by their statutory independence, but rather by
the reputational management of their leaders. This find-
ing calls for wider inquiry into drivers of agency auton-
omy and performance.
It would also be worth to re-consider the relation-
ship between corruption and regulation. Dunlop and
Radaelli (2019) have reviewed the more frequent claims
about regulation and corruption: Deregulation hinders
corruption; it is the quality of regulation that hinders cor-
ruption; specific anti-corruption heavy regulatory frame-
works raise the cost of applying for public procurement
and funding, while regulatory complexity resulting from
the layering of anticorruption measures makes para-
doxically non-compliance harder to detect. Dunlop and
Radaelli suggest to re-cast this debate by focusing on the
combination of policy instruments that affect rulemak-
ing (judicial review, regulatory impact assessment, free-
dom of information acts, etc.). This opens a new area
of inquiry that would benefit from work on data that is
needed to examine variations in patterns of rulemaking.
Finally, it is often argued that more of the respon-
sibility for anticorruption should be delegated to local
communities, civil society actors, and ordinary people,
whose mobilization against corruption might take advan-
tage of digital technologies (Kossow & Kukutschka, 2017;
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Zinnbauer, 2015). Future research should focus on gath-
ering more evidence on organizational and individual de-
terminants of the decision to report wrongdoing and
fight corruption (Su, 2020; Su & Ni, 2018; Taylor, 2018).
This would help understand how dissatisfaction with cor-
ruption can be channeled to bring about change (Peiffer
& Alvarez, 2016).
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